PLANTINGA ON EXCLUSIVISM
A (religious) exclusivist =df (i) a person who believes certain specific
propositions involved in some one religions but not others [e.g., (1) and (2)
below], (ii) who is fully aware of other religions, (iii) knows that there is
much that looks like genuine piety and devoutness in those other religions, and
(iv) knows of no argument that they think would convince all or most of those
intelligent and honest adherents of those other religions.
Call the conjunction conditions (ii)-(iv) with respect to the beliefs in
question Condition C.
Examples of Specific Propositions of the Sort Held by an Exclusivist:
(1) The world was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing,
and perfectly good personal being.
(2) Human beings require salvation, and God has provided a
unique way of salvation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death, and
resurrection of His divine son.
Observation: There is nothing special about the examples (1) and (2) with
respect to Exclusivism. One could just as well hold one or more of the
specific propositions we listed in connection with Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism,
etc.
I. Moral Objections to Exclusivism
[Note: One cannot consistently both urge that there is something morally
wrong with the exclusivist position and also hold that “ethics and values
are all relative”.]
Objection 1: The exclusivist believes (a) that those who hold other
religious beliefs are just mistaken and (b) that those who fail to hold his/her
particular beliefs is failing to believe something deep and important.
They therefore take themselves to be privileged with respect to those other
people. This is an arrogant or elitist attitude and as such is morally
reprehensible.
Plantinga’s Reply:
(1) If this charge of a moral defect is correct, then there
must be some possible way to correctly adjust ones’ beliefs so as to
eliminate the defect. [“Ought implies can”].
(2) The only possible responses that could eliminate the
alleged moral error would be to either (i) believe the negations of the
particular exclusivist beliefs in question, or (ii) abstain from believing
either the exclusivist beliefs or their negations.
(3) Course (i) does not remedy the alleged problem because
one still believes something that makes one an exclusivist, and course (ii)
does not remedy the alleged problem because one who withholds belief is still
implicitly claiming that their attitude toward the propositions in question is
privileged.
(4) Since no possible “doxastic state” would
avoid the charge in question, the claim that it is a moral defect must be
mistaken.
A doxastic state with respect to a proposition is just some state of belief,
disbelief, or “withholding” (agnosticism) with respect to the
proposition.
Plantinga’s Refutation of the Abstemious Pluralist’s Position:
The pluralist who withholds belief from any specific propositions involving
religion holds that:
(3) If S knows that others don’t believe p and that he or she is in the
“exclusivist condition C” with respect to p, then S should not
believe p.
But if the abstemious pluralist accepts (3), then they must hold that they
should not accept (3) – since they are in condition C with respect to
(3). The position is thus “self-refuting”.
II. Epistemic Objections to Exclusivism
Objection (2) The exclusivist is unjustified or irrational in hold to
his/her specific beliefs given that they are in condition C.
Plantinga’s Reply: The exclusivist may have reflected upon all the
evidence and on the existence of other religious and it may still seem to
him/her that the specific propositions are true. Then they are subject to
no censure for flouting their epistemic duty. They will not take their
beliefs to be on an epistemic par with those of other religions. So they
cannot be charged with being arbitrary. How would it be possible to do
better with respect to any belief?
Plantinga goes on to argue that that the exclusivist may even know the specific
propositions in question. In that case they are not to be criticized for
believing them.
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