USING A CRITERION TO TEST FOR VERIDICAL
EXPERIENCE
Could Teresa argue:
(1) A vision from God would produce certain beneficial
spiritual effects and a vision from the Devil would produce harmful spiritual
effects.
(2) My visions have produced good spiritual effects – I
remember my recent actions and mental states to have positive spiritual
attributes.
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(3) I am not deceived about the source of my vision –
it is not from the Devil. (?)
A WAY OUT?
P is contingent =df P is not necessarily true and P is not necessarily false.
Proposition P is cartesian-safe for N
=df (1) P is contingent, and (2) necessarily, if N believes P, then P.
If she could find a proposition of the form “I have H” that would
justify her principle about the spiritual effects of divine and demonic visions
and her other claims about her spiritual states, St. Teresa could argue:
(1) The proposition I would express by saying “I have
H” is cartesian- safe for me.
(2) If (1) and I believe that I have H, then I do have H.
(3) If I believe that I have H, then I do have H.
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(4) If I believe that H, then I am not therein deceived by
the Devil.
A Problem with the Strategy:
“P is cartesian-safe” is not in general itself Cartesian-safe.
MODUS PONENS (“Modus ponendo ponens”)
If P, then Q
P____
Q
Mavrodes’s conclusions:
Trying to find, and appealing to, a criterion for veridical
experience will not work as a general strategy for distinguishing it from deceptive
experience. But some things impress themselves upon us so strongly as
being true, that real doubt is impossible.
The Bottom Line:
“If anyone thinks that I am lying [or mistaken- C.A.A.] I beseech God, in
His goodness, to give him the same experience”
St. Teresa