TWO
KINDS OF MORAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
(1) Theoretical moral arguments:
Arguments that conclude that it is reasonable to believe that God exists
because His existence is the best explanation for the existence, nature, and
our knowledge of objective moral truths. Such arguments assume or try to
defend the view that there are objective moral truths.
(2) Practical moral arguments: Arguments that conclude
that one ought to believe because of the moral value (intrinsic value, value to
the believer and/or value to others) of believing that there is a God.
We have already encountered this distinction in the readings by Lois Hope
Walker and G.E. Moore. C. S. Lewis’s moral arguments are mostly of
the theoretical kind.
C. S. Lewis’s Main Argument
Lewis’s Premise (1): Everyone knows, and so believes, that there are
objective moral truths.
Lewis: People blame, praise, and try influence things on the basis of the
belief that certain things are really right and wrong – in some objective
sense. And it really is obvious that, e.g., cruelty is wrong.
Objection 1: Many people deny that there is any objective right or wrong.
Lewis: They are always inconsistent in that they go on believing and
asserting such that, e.g. some actions are unfair and that there is sometimes
such a thing as the “objectively right side” in a war.
Objection 2: Our sense of morality is just a “herd instinct”
that has developed (perhaps by evolution).
Lewis: Morality sometimes commands that we act in accordance with the
weaker instinct (e.g. to save a drowning man). Morality sometimes
requires that certain instincts be suppressed or encouraged in a way contrary
to our natural impulses. So it is implausible that morality itself is an
“instinct”.
[Note that Lewis is assuming that we are sometimes aware of a conflict between
instinct and the Moral Law – and so that the latter is perceived as
objective.]
Objection 3: Morality is a social convention, something that is put into
us by education.
Lewis: We believe that some societies are better than others and that
there is such a thing as “moral progress” in a society. How
could there be such things if each society determines by its actual conventions
what is right or wrong for it? The fact that something has to be taught,
e.g. mathematics, does not imply that it is not objective. Ethical facts
may be like mathematical facts.
Objection 4: Different civilizations and different ages have had quite
different moralities. This indicates that morality is relative, not
objective.
Lewis: Underneath many differences in particular moral codes there are
common basis of moral principles. For example, variants of the Golden
Rule occur in very many different cultures. Try to imagine a society
where cowardice is admired and where double-crossing people who have been kind
to you is a cause for pride.
There is much more to be said for, and against, all of these objections.
In particular, in connection with Objection 4: One should observe that
(a) disagreement in complex cases (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, and the like) is
compatible with fundamental agreement in basic moral principles, (b)
disagreement about non-moral matters can and does lead to moral disagreement
and so does not necessarily indicate fundamental moral disagreement.
Also concerning Objection 4: It should also be noticed (on the other side) that
real cases of fundamental moral disagreement across and within societies do
seem to really occur.
Lewis’s Premise (2): Objective moral laws are very peculiar in that they
are quite unlike Laws of Nature and “natural” facts.
Objection 1:
Moral claims are merely expressions of preferences with a certain force,
attempting to influence the attitudes of the listener, not the beliefs.
Hence the peculiar “Oomph” or moral flavor of such claims is to be
explained by the effects that they have on attitudes.
Reply: The examples concerning the Nazis and others strike us as not
merely being concerned with attitudes. We act, and talk, as if we took
some moral claims to be actual facts of some kind.
Objection 2:
Ordinary moral claims perhaps do purport to be objective, but in that case they
are all simply false – there is no such peculiar properties as
“goodness” or “rightness” are alleged to be, attaching
to certain things and actions but are not observable by the senses.
Comment: This is a coherent position. Many ordinary judgments about
right and wrong do seem to purport to be about something objective. But
if there are moral properties and moral facts, they are very different from
“natural” facts of psychology or physics. And it may be that
there are simply no such mysterious facts. This objection agrees with the
Premise 2 to the extent that it admits that if there were any objective moral
facts, they would have to be quite peculiar. But, it just denies that
there are any such facts.
Lewis’s Premise (3): The hypothesis that there is an intelligence
behind, or beyond, the natural facts that implants the knowledge of right and
wrong in us and serves as the foundation for the objectivity of such judgments
is the best (or a good) explanation of our intuitions of objective moral facts.
Objection 1: The best explanation for our so-called
“intuitions” of moral facts is just that we are taught and conditioned
by our parents and society to react to certain things in a positive or negative
way.
Objection 2: Another possible explanation for our intuitions of moral facts is
that the general principles are necessary truths of the same sort as
mathematics and logic and that we know them “a priori” –
simply by thinking about them. One difficulty with this view is that it
does not fit very well with a general naturalistic viewpoint. Necessary
truths and our knowledge of them seem “spooky”, quite unlike our knowledge
of the world through the senses.
Conclusion: The existence and nature of objective moral facts supports
the existence of an intelligence behind them serving as their basis and
foundation.
Observation:
This conclusion is only as good as Lewis’s claim, Premise (3), that the
most (or a) reasonable explanation for the facts is the God-hypothesis.
Lewis himself does not provide any real explanation of how God is supposed to
serve as the “foundation” of ethics.
LEWIS’S MORAL ARGUMENT RE-ASSEMBLED
Lewis’s Premise (1): Everyone knows, and so believes, that there are
objective moral truths.
Lewis’s Premise (2): Objective moral laws are very peculiar in that they
are quite unlike Laws of Nature and “natural” facts.
Lewis’s Premise (3): The hypothesis that there is an intelligence
behind, or beyond, the natural facts that implants the knowledge of right and
wrong in us and serves as the foundation for the objectivity of such judgments
is the best (or a good) explanation of our intuitions of objective moral facts.
Conclusion: The existence and nature of objective moral facts supports
the existence of an intelligence behind them serving as their basis and
foundation.