Most of my research has been connected in one way or another with the problem of analyzing and attempting to refute Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world. I have written on, and remain interested in, the following related topics: the deductive closure principle, transcendental arguments in Kant and in contemporary writers, theories of epistemic justification, the realism/anti-realism debate, anti-skeptical arguments from externalism about meaning and the content of mental states (as in Putnam and Davidson), the compatibility of such externalism and self-knowledge, the nature of self-knowledge, and skepticism about knowledge of meaning and content. I have also written a bit on personal identity and the metaphysics of death. I have as well an ongoing interest in philosophy of language and the metaphysics of free will.

Selected Bibliography

Book

• Essays on Skepticism (2010, OUP)

ARTICLES

• "Johnsen on Brains in Vats," Philosophical Studies 129 (2006): 435-40.
• "Justification and Moore’s Paradox," Analysis 66 (2006): 264-6.
• "Contextualism, Hawthorne’s Invariantism and Third-Person Cases," The Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 315-8.
• "Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity," Analysis 65 (2005): 294-301.
• "Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown," Analysis 65 (2005): 86-8.
• "Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge," Analysis 64 (2004): 333-5.
• "Brewer on the McKinsey Problem," Analysis 64 (2004): 41-3.
• "The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism," Philosophical Studies 118 (2004): 401-5.
• "Trees, Computer Program Features and Skeptical Hypotheses," in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Steven Luper (ed.). Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2003.
• "Tensed Sentences, Tenseless Truth Conditions, and Tensed Beliefs," in Time, Tense, and Reference, Aleksandar Jokic and Quentin Smith (eds.). The MIT Press, 2003.
• "Two Transcendental Arguments Concerning Self-Knowledge," in New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Susanna Nuccetelli (ed.). The MIT Press, 2003.
• "Self-Knowledge via Inner Observation of External Objects?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 118-22.
• "What Missed Clues Cases Show," Analysis 63 (2003): 303-5.
• "Not Wanting to Know," Analysis 63 (2003): 250-6.
• "The Coherence of Scepticism about Self-Knowledge," Analysis 63 (2003): 41-8.
• "Contents Just Aren’t In the Head," Erkenntnis 58 (2003): 1-6.
• "Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument," Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 285-93. With Mark Oreste Fiocco.
• "The Consistency of Content-Externalism and Justification-Internalism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002): 512-5.
• "Williamson on the Primeness of Knowing," Analysis 62 (2002): 197-202.
• "Anti-Individualism and Analyticity," Analysis 62 (2002): 87-91.
• "Defending Burge’s Thought Experiment," Erkenntnis 55 (2001): 387-91.
• "Problems for the Agency Model of Self-Knowledge," Dialogue 40 (2001): 545-54.
• "Chalmer’s Conceivability Argument for Dualism," Analysis 61 (2001): 187-93.
• "A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available," Philosophical Studies 104 (2001): 109-14.
• "Van Inwagen on the Cosmological Argument," Philosophical Papers 30 (2001): 31-40.
• "BonJour’s A Priori Justification of Induction," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 1-10.
• "Ambiguity and Knowledge of Content," Analysis 60 (2000): 257-60.
• "Externalism and the A Prioricity of Self-Knowledge," Analysis 60 (2000): 132-6.
• "Is Superassertible a Truth Predicate?" Nous 32 (1998): 76-81.
• "Trying to Get Outside Your Own Skin," Philosophical Topics, (1996).
• "Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World," Philosophical Review 103 (1993):327-343.
• "Semantic Answers to Skepticism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, (1992).
• "What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori," Analysis 52 (2):111-18.
  (Reprinted in David Chalmers ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press.)
• "Skepticism about Knowledge of Content," Mind 99 (1990): 447-451.
• "Problems with Internalist Coherentism," Philosophical Studies, (1989).
• "Brains in a Vat," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 148-167.
• "Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Metaphysical Realism," Analysis 44 (1984): 134-140.
• "Transcendental Arguments I," Nous 17 (1983): 551-575.

ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRY

• “Brains in a Vat,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004).

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