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| Areas of Specialization | Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics |
| Areas of Competence | Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Ethics, Medieval Philosophy |
| Education | University of California Santa Barbara, December 2010 P.H.D. in Philosophy University of California at Santa Barbara, June 2007 M.A. in Philosophy University of Athens - Greece, June 2004 M.Sc. in History & Philosophy of Science Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine - U.K., June 1999 B.Sc. Mathematics and Computer Science – honours |
| Publications | Tsompanidis, V. (2010). "Smart and tensed beliefs". <i>Philosophia</i> . Volume 38, Number 2 / June, 2010. Pages: 313-325. |
| Presentations | "Smart and tensed beliefs" Invited Speaker at <i>Time on Trial</i> conference, West Virginia University. Apr, 2008. "Truth-conditions, conceptual buffers & tensed belief" - 6th Annual International Conference on Philosophy, Athens, Greece. - 2011 Midsouth Philosophy Conference - 2011 North Carolina Philosophical Society Meeting "A defense of a B-Theory of time" Guest Lecture. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas, National Autonomous University of Mexico. Nov. 2007. |
| Professional Activity | Organization committee, reviewer: "Chance and Destiny" interdisciplinary graduate conference – U.C.Santa Barbara, Spring 2010 Member of APA, Philosophy of Time Society Reviewer, <i>Philosophia</i> (2010). Textbook Reviewer, Oxford University Press (2010) Visiting Scholar, Ohio State University. Sep 2008-Jun 2009, Mar 2010 - now. Visiting Student, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas – Mexico. Fall 2007 |
| Dissertation | "Tensed Belief" My dissertation presents a novel account of the content of a tensed belief that bridges approaches from the philosophy of time and the literature on indexicals. I argue that the way to understand tensed belief and explain timely action should be closely tied to instances of perception. My account of tensed belief can also be used to defend a tenseless account of Time against forceful objections. Kevin Falvey (dir), Anthony Brueckner, Nathan Salmon, David Sanson |

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| Honors | <p>University of California, Santa Barbara:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Paul Weinpahl Award for Teaching Excellence, 2008 (career award) - Graduate USAP Fellowship, 2010 - Ralph. W. Church Fellowship, 2004-2005 <p>West Virginia University</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Invited Speaker Honorarium & Grant, 2008 <p>London, U. K.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Associate of the Royal College of Science, 1999 |
| Teaching Experience | <p>University of California Santa Barbara – Dpt. of Philosophy</p> <p>Teaching Associate (independently taught)</p> <p>(introductory level course with an enrollment of 200 students; course design, preparation of materials, instructing, using film & instructional technology. I have taught this course twice)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - History of Philosophy: Medieval/Early Modern, Winter & Summer 2008 - Greek 11-12, Fall 2009-Winter 2010 <p>Full responsibility of section, materials, course design, instructing, grading, using instructional technology for a communicative approach.</p> <p>Capital University – Dpt. Of Religion & Philosophy</p> <p>Adjunct Instructor (independently taught)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ethics & Contemporary Religious Conviction, Winter/Spring 2009, Summer/Fall 2010 <p>(1-semester introductory level course on ethical theory and applied ethics; full responsibility of 2 sections of approximately 25 students each, course design, preparation of materials, instructing, grading, using multimedia approaches)</p> <p>University of California Santa Barbara – Dpt. of Philosophy</p> <p>Teaching Assistant (leading weekly discussions, grading)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 100D – Philosophy of Mind (upper level course, twice) - Introduction to Philosophy (twice) - History of Philosophy: Medieval/Early Modern Philosophy (twice) - Introduction to Ethics - History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy <p>Related Employment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - I. B. Physics Private Tutor (Santa Barbara, Winter/Spring 2008) - G. R. E. Private Tutor (Mexico, Fall 2007) - Senior Software Engineer - Intracom Hellas S. A. 1999-2003 Project Manager, Team Leader, Responsible for training new employees |
| Work in progress | <p>”Tensed belief in a tenseless world”. Manuscript</p> <p>”Tense, truth-conditions & conceptual buffers”. Manuscript</p> <p>”Why syntactic relations are not elements of propositions: Cross-linguistic Syntactic Variability” (w. J. Grinstead)</p> |
| Languages | <p>Greek (native), English (fluent), German, Ancient Greek (advanced), Spanish</p> |

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| <p>Graduate Courses taken</p> <p>PHD in Philosophy (University California at Santa Barbara)</p> <p>-Asterisks indicate the course was audited-</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. History of Philosophy: Kant (H. Schwyzer) 2. History of Philosophy: Plato (V. Tsouna) 3. History of Philosophy: Hume (T. Holden) 4. History of Philosophy: Epicureans* (V. Tsouna) 5. Symbolic Logic (N. Salmon) 6. Philosophical Logic (A. Anderson) 7. Philosophy of Time (K. Falvey) 8. Quantum Mechanics (S. Humphrey) 9. Philosophy of Mathematics* (M. Rescorla) 10. Philosophy of Science: Space & Time (S. Humphrey) 11. Topics in Political Philosophy: Rawls (C. McMahan) 12. Ethics & Action Theory (M. Hanser) 13. Contextualism (Zimmerman) 14. Self-Knowledge (K. Falvey)* 15. Meaning and Reference (N. Salmon) 16. Topics in Philosophy of Language: Fictional Characters (N. Salmon) 17. Topics in Philosophy of Language: Kripke* (N. Salmon) 18. Topics in Philosophy of Language: Quine & Russell* (N. Salmon) 19. Directed Research on Tensed Belief (K. Falvey) 20. Topics in Philosophy of Mind: Physicalism (K. Falvey) 21. Topics in Philosophy of Mind: Perception* (K. Falvey) 22. Consciousness* (J. Loomis et al in the UCSB Psychology Department) 23. Self-Knowledge* (T. Burge at U.C.L.A.) |
| <p>Ohio State University seminars (audited)</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Perception & Agency (W. Wu) 2. Metaphysics of Propositions (B. Caplan) 3. Pragmatism – Rorty & Sellars (R. Kraut) 4. Contextualism (S. Shapiro) |
| <p>Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (UNAM)</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Philosophy of Language: Conditionals* (R. Dietz) 2. Temporal Logic* (L. Clapp) 3. Seminar on Philosophy of Mind & Phil. of Language (various) |
| <p>M.Sc. in History & Philosophy of Science (University of Athens)</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Philosophy & Science (A. Mpaltas) 2. Metaphysics & Epistemology (V. Kindi) 3. History of Philosophy: Modern/Early Modern Philosophy (V. Kindi) 4. Logic 5. Philosophy & Literature (S. Virvidakis) 6. T. S. Kuhn : Modern Interpretations (V. Kindi) 7. French Structuralism & Post-structuralism (A. Mpaltas) 8. History of Science III (17th & 18th cent.) (K. Gavroglou) 9. History of Science IV (Historiography) (K. Gavroglou) |
| <p>References</p> <p>For access to the UCSB reference letters, please email the departmental advisor, Miss Cami Helmuth helmuth@hfa.ucsb.edu</p> | <p>Kevin Falvey (falvey@philosophy.ucsb.edu), dissertation director. Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara (805) 893-7528</p> <p>Anthony Brueckner (brueckne@philosophy.ucsb.edu). Professor of Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara (805) 893-8497</p> <p>Voula Tsouna (vtouna@philosophy.ucsb.edu). Professor of Philosophy, Chair of the Dpt. Of Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara (805) 893-3990</p> <p>Nathan Salmon (nsalmon@philosophy.ucsb.edu). Professor of Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara (805) 893-4028</p> <p>Aaron Zimmerman (azimmerman@philosophy.ucsb.edu). Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara (805) 893-2632</p> |

Dissertation Abstract: **Tensed Belief**

This work examines how human beings think about time and what this could tell us about the nature of time itself. In particular it addresses the following question: If world events do not have temporal properties like ‘pastness’ or ‘present-ness’, what is the correct explanation for a belief such as my belief that my root canal is in the past?

Human beings seem to capture time (or temporal properties of events and things) in thought by having beliefs usually expressed with statements involving tense or notions such as ‘present’, ‘past’ and ‘future’. Tensed beliefs like these seem to be indispensable for correct reasoning, timely action, and rationalization of our actions. For instance my belief that my root canal is over seems inexpressible with a statement that does not use tense or notions such as ‘over’ or ‘the past’. However, the dominant view on the nature of time is that it forms, with space, a four-dimensional continuum where time does not encompass private perspectives or an absolute, fixed present. This so-called ‘tenseless theory of time’ is unequivocally supported by science, but encounters a clear challenge in attempting to integrate tensed beliefs. The challenge is biting, because a tenseless theorist must not only explain what makes tensed beliefs true; she needs to explain what constitutes a tensed belief in a tenseless world and how it works inside a network of beliefs to bring about the actions and decisions it normally does. Providing such an account is the main goal of my dissertation.

In this work I argue that the correct way to proceed would be to examine theories in philosophy of mind and language that deal with indexicality and apply them to a tensed belief. This is because the puzzling features of a tensed belief are shared with similar beliefs expressed with first-person or spatial indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘here’. In Chapters II and III I expound the dominant theories about indexicality in beliefs, associated with D. Lewis, J. Perry and D. Kaplan, and apply them to the specific problem at hand. I show that none of these theories can be applied to the problem of tensed beliefs straightforwardly; each is in certain respects incomplete or inadequate. For instance, I show that applying Lewis’s theory of indexical belief as self-ascription of a property does not answer my working question. This is because under such a theory my belief that the root canal is over cannot result in a timely decision if I do not self-ascribe a *tensed* property like ‘presently-being-after-the-root-canal’; and such a property is not allowed under a tenseless theory of time.

My preferred account essentially critiques the preceding theories as misattributing the indexicality involved in a tensed belief to a fully *conceptual* element in the way people think about time. I argue that it would be more fruitful to connect this indexicality to elements of thought that might be plausibly taken as not fully conceptual in nature, as T. Burge does for some cases of *de re* belief. For support I turn to work in perceptual psychology that connects beliefs about space to perception of spatial features. In my last chapter I develop an analogous argument about temporal thought and discuss how perceptions can be related in thought to the formation and preservation of tensed beliefs. Combining this story with a tenseless theory of time is easier than the preceding theories and gives us a complete, metaphysically uncontroversial, account of the way a tensed belief functions in reasoning and producing timely action.