| Research Abstract
As Jason Stanley once put it:
Some philosophers are drawn to the subject [of philosophy] via their interest in the nature and structure of the world external to us. Others are drawn to it by an interest in the capacities that make humans distinctive in the world. I am a philosopher of the latter sort. My work thus far has been clustered around the nexus of knowledge, communication, and human action.
I find myself drawn to the subject much in the way that Stanley is. And one of the things that makes humans distinctive in the world is the capacity to guide their behavior by principles that philosophers call "normative." What's normative is supposed to be contrasted with what's non-normative (sometimes called "descriptive" or, more unfotrunately, "factual"). Certain statements, for example, are normative in that they are about what one should do, what one has reason to do, what one ought to do, etc. Other statements, however, lack normative content, such as claims about what a person merely does do. We find so-called "normativity" primarily in both ethics (roughly the study of what we should do) and epistemology (roughly the study of what we should believe). I'm especially interested in normative creatures, that is, creatures that can reason about what to do (or think) and can do this for good or bad reasons. Such creatures philosophers usually call "agents," though most assume the only agents around are human beings. So, to put it simply, I'm especially interested in what is often called "agency" or the kinds of behavior and thought processes distinctive of rational, self-reflective beings (such as humans) as opposed to so-called "lower animals." Of course this leads to classic issues about the nature and scope of practical reasoning, rationality, normativity, motivation, reasons, and other central issues in moral psychology and action theory.
My dissertation focuses on the nature of rational motivation. I attempt to defend a broadly Kantian view according to which we have the capacity to "act from duty." By looking to both empirical and non-empirical considerations, I defend this idea against two key "empiricist" challenges: psychological egoism and so-called "Humean" theories.
In future work, I hope to draw on my research thus far to address the topics of my broader research project---understanding how we act for good reasons, guide our actions by normative principles, and so on. I plan to continue to approach these issues in an interdisciplinary way by looking to both philosophy and scientific psychology, perhaps even doing some so-called "experimental philosophy" (a rising method of inquiry that I think can augment, but not replace, more traditional methods of inquiry in some areas of philosophy).
Note: For Fall 2009, I will be a visiting student in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT.
Bibliography
ARTICLES
- "Relational Desires and Empirical Evidence against Psychological Egoism," forthcoming, European Journal of Philosophy.
Abstract: Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological altruism is the thesis that some of a person's intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are ultimately other-regarding in some sense. C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have argued that experiments provide support for a theory called the "empathy-altruism hypothesis" that entails the falsity of psychological egoism. However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the data that are still not ruled out. One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. I argue for two main theses in this paper: (1) we can improve on Sober and Wilson’s conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson's purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable. A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson‘s claim that the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject psychological egoism.
- "Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study," forthcoming, Review of Philosophy & Psychology (formerly European Review of Philosophy), Psychology and Experimental Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 3 (2010), Edouard Machery, Tania Lombrozo, & Joshua Knobe (eds.).
Co-authored with: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull, and Aaron Zimmerman.
Abstract: In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. The cases we focus on are two that are crucial to Stanley’s project: one in which the protagonist does not have practical interest in the truth of the proposition she claims to know (Low Stakes) and one in which the protagonist does have such practical interest (High Stakes). We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make, regarding the salience of an alternative, in his critique of Stanley ("The Irrelevance of the Subject," 2006). Our data indicate that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves people from attributing knowledge to denying it. However, the raising of stakes (but not alternatives) does affect the level of confidence people have in their attributions of knowledge. We argue that our data cast doubt on what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our common-sense judgments about such cases are.
REVIEWS
IN PROGRESS
- "What in the World is Weakness of Will?" (with Richard Holton)
Abstract: At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia (i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do). However, there has been some recent debate about whether this at all captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton (1999, 2009) claims that it doesn’t while Alfred Mele (forthcoming) argues that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary notion here is one apt for empirical investigation. Our plan is to evaluate Mele’s studies and report an experiment of our own in order to help figure out what in the world people’s ordinary notion of weakness of will is (which in turn may help in finding out what weakness of will itself is). We tentatively conclude that neither Mele nor Holton (previously) was quite right: people’s notion of weakness of will is more of a cluster-concept.
- Philosophy 101 and Experimental Philosophy”
Abstract: During a recent stint teaching Introduction to Philosophy, I seized the opportunity to mix in some experimental philosophy. I did this in two ways: (a) I put some articles on experimental philosophy on the syllabus, and (b) I ran a survey at the end of the course to gain information on students’ impressions of philosophy having taken the course. The results were quite interesting given that things turned out almost exactly opposite from what I expected, at least for the hypotheses I was most interested in testing. First, I expected students to largely dislike the course. After all, most students seem to loath philosophy. Second, I expected to find students primarily drawn to the topic of experimental philosophy and to cryout that this is what we should have been doing the whole time. (I thought this not because I think this is right and obvious. Rather, I thought it because it has always seemed that university students by and large are drawn toward and revere empirical methods over non-empirical ones which are often found in philosophy.) Third, I expected students to find the material on experimental philosophy rather interesting. But, for the most part, none of my expectations were met.
Other Interests / Quotes / Links / Photos
See Josh’s Web Site...
But, for now, here are two quotes apt for this page:
30 Rock:
"We might not be the best people" - Jack
"But we're not the worst!" - Liz
"Graduate students are the worst." - Jack and Liz
(YouTube clip)
The Simpsons:
"Bart, don't make fun of grad students; they just made a terrible life choice." - Marge
(YouTube clip)
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