I am interested in issues pertaining to meaning and rationality and especially concerned with the relation between the two, i.e. the nexus between semantics and epistemology. When does one have knowledge of meaning? Are there truths that one can come to know simply by having knowledge of meaning and doing a bit of reasoning? If two propositions differ in epistemic value must they differ in semantic value? Is there more to the meaning of an expression than its referent? If so, what? and what is it like? If not, how do we make sense of knowledge of meaning and a priori reasoning? How does all this square with a posteriori necessities? What does this tell us about the prospect of conceptual analysis and/or a priori knowledge?, etc. Presently, I am looking into whether or not some kind of Fregean (or neo-Fregean) theory can provide satisfying answer to the above question. Of particular interest in this respect is epistemic two-dimensional semantics. Aside from these foundational problems I have an ongoing interest in a number of metaphysical and metaethical questions (e.g. ontology, the mind, the good, and modality).

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