My dissertation (Tensed Belief) presents a novel account of the content of a tensed belief that bridges approaches from the philosophy of time and the literature on indexicals. I argue that the way to understand tensed belief and explain timely action should be closely tied to instances of perception. My account of tensed belief can also be used to defend a tenseless account of Time against forceful objections.

Bibliography

Article

• "Smart and Tensed Beliefs," forthcoming, Philosophia. Volume 28, Number 2 / June, 2010. Pages: 313-325.
  
  Abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend a prototype B-theory answer to McTaggart’s Puzzle about Time. Smart hopes to solve the issue by pointing to the “anthropocentricity” of temporal A-notions. There is one important problem: explaining Prior cases (for instance being relieved that a painful experience is over) in B-theoretic terms. First, it is argued that the problem is how to explain the nature of the subject’s tensed belief in Prior cases; the essential indexicality of the concept ‘now’. Then it is suggested that Smart could utilize Burge’s framework for dealing with de re beliefs and a way of formalizing tensed beliefs is proposed. The last section of the paper deals with the exact role of the formalized indexical element. If these three steps are worked out, we might have an explanation of the facts involved in Prior cases without mentioning any A-facts. Hence an important problem to a Smart-influenced B-theory is solved, and McTaggart’s Puzzle answered in an adequate manner.

Work in Progress

• ”Tensed Belief In A Tenseless World”
  
  Abstract: This paper attempts to set the stage for a constructive analysis of the nature and function of tensed beliefs. I start with a nominal characterization of what a tensed belief is, by presenting examples of what I take to be tensed beliefs (1.0). Then I examine various ways to provide a more complete definition of the category of tensed beliefs (1.1), concluding with a working definition incorporating temporal indexical statements (1.2). Section 1.3 presents some methodological constraints on the project, as well as a clear statement of its goal. It is followed by an A-theoretic account of the nature of tensed beliefs (1.4). I argue that such an account would have problems with its metaphysics (1.4a), as well as problems in describing how the tensed belief is connected to tensed facts or giving an error theory for failing to connect to such facts (1.4b).
• "Why syntactic relations are not elements of propositions: Cross-linguistic Syntactic Variability"
  
  Abstract: This paper discusses Jeffrey King’s (2007) view that propositions are certain facts about items in the world and our linguistic representations of them. I argue that his definition does not work across different languages; for instance the fact he presents as being his paradigm proposition that Dara swims will not correspond to any proposition believed by a monolingual Greek speaker. I further argue that the account’s failure to individuate some basic propositions like the above cross-linguistically entails that King’s propositions are either incompatible with a direct reference framework or cannot do all the work that propositions traditionally are taken to do.
• Truth-Conditions, Conceptual Buffers and Tensed Belief"
  
  Abstract: I discuss John Perry’s conceptual folders (or ‘buffers’) framework for analyzing the contents of beliefs (from his (2002) Knowledge, Possibility & Consciousness) and attempt to form an account of the nature of tensed belief based on the framework. I argue that following Perry's framework can give us a tenseless account of tensed belief that keeps the essential indexicality of the belief intact, while making progress in depicting the rational process involved resulting in timely action. However, I conclude that such an account is ultimately incomplete due to its reliance on the truth-conditional method of describing a belief’s contents, as well as its inability to describe temporal perception episodes.

Supplementary Materials for Dossier

Transcripts

• University of Athens MA in History and Philosophy of Science

Evaluations

• UCSB Student Evaluative Feedback (2006-2008)
• UCSB Teaching Associate Evaluations (Winter 2008, History of Philosophy)
• UCSB Teaching Assistant Evaluation Summary (2005-2008)
• Capital University Evaluations (2009, Ethics, 2 sections)

Syllabi of Independently Taught Classes

• Ethics & Applied Ethics
• History of Medieval & Early Modern Philosophy

Sample Teaching PowerPoints

• Moral Relativism (PPT)
• Kantianism (PPT)

Awards

• Paul Weinpahl Award for Teaching Excellence

Other Interests / Quotes / Links / Photos